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Abstract
This is a response to Ásgeir Tryggvason’s argument that the deliberative critique of the agonistic 
approach to citizenship education is based on a misreading of the main concepts in agonistic theory— 
a misreading that has important implications for any attempt to bring closer agonism and delibera-
tion in citizenship education. My aim in this response is to offer some clarifying comments and  
questions and suggest some further ideas for expanding Tryggvason’s analysis, highlighting in par-
ticular two perspectives that, in my view, deserve further attention in citizenship education: first, the 
consequences of cultivating agonistic emotions in the classroom; and, second, the possibilities and 
limitations of acknowledging what has been called “affective citizenship” as an important element of 
citizenship education. My response concludes by discussing how affective citizenship education illu-
minates the debate between agonists and deliberators.
This article is in response to
Tryggvason, A. (2018). Democratic education and agonism: Exploring the critique from deliberative 
theory. Democracy & Education, 26(1), Article 1. 
Available at: http:// democracyeducationjournal .org/ home/ vol26/ iss1/ 1.
Tryggvason’s (2018) paper came at a time when there is an increasing interest in citizenship educa-tion about the role affect and emotion play in 
discussing difficult and controversial issues in the classroom. The 
arguments for and against the place of emotions in citizenship 
education are not new, of course; they have been debated for some 
time. On one hand, there is the argument that emotions are central 
in an agonistic approach to citizenship education because emotions 
are considered an essential aspect of political and democratic life. 
On the other hand, the deliberative perspective— certainly not a 
monolithic one— puts emphasis on reason and rational argumenta-
tion; therefore, emotions are not trusted to have a legitimate place 
in political discussions in the classroom. In his paper, Tryggvason 
offered a compelling review and analysis of these arguments, 
drawing on the differences and similarities between deliberative 
education and agonistic education. Tryggvason argued that 
agonism (which is often grounded in Mouffe’s theory of agonistic 
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pluralism) and deliberation (which includes a variety of perspec-
tives that do not amount a single body of principles) are joint in the 
critique of essentialist identities and person- oriented emotions 
within education. However, Tryggvason wrote, an attempt “to 
assimilate agonism with deliberation in citizenship education 
cannot be successful if the notion of agonism stems from Mouffe’s 
theory of agonistic pluralism [but rather] an assimilation of this 
kind would have to be based on other notions and definitions of 
agonism if it is successful” (p. 7). Tryggvason went on to suggest a 
“tamed version” (p. 7) of agonism as a link to deliberation.
Tryggvason’s (2018) analysis that the deliberative critique of 
the agonistic approach to citizenship education is based on a 
misreading of the main concepts in agonistic theory is extremely 
valuable, because this misreading has indeed important implica-
tions for any attempt to bring closer agonism and deliberation in 
citizenship education. My aim in this response is to offer some 
clarifying comments and questions and suggest some further ideas 
for expanding Tryggvason’s analysis, highlighting in particular two 
perspectives that, in my view, deserve further attention in consid-
ering citizenship education and agonism: first, the consequences of 
cultivating agonistic emotions in the classroom and, second, the 
possibilities and limitations of acknowledging what has been called 
affective citizenship (Fortier, 2010, 2016; Johnson, 2010; Mookher-
jee, 2005) as an important element of citizenship education 
(Zembylas, 2014, 2015), particularly in relation to how affective 
citizenship education illuminates the debate between agonists and 
deliberators.
Summary of the Original Argument
Tryggvason (2018) began his article by asking several questions, 
among which was what role students’ identities and emotions 
should play in political discussions in the classroom. To respond to 
this question, the paper examined two prominent approaches in 
citizenship education during the last two decades: deliberative 
education and agonistic education. As Tryggvason explained, the 
deliberative ideal and the agonistic ideal promote different views of 
classroom discussions. On one hand, the deliberative ideal 
emphasizes that conflict of opinions should be transcended, and 
thus, discussions should aim at cultivating rational deliberation 
and reaching some sort of consensus. On the other hand, the 
agonistic ideal emphasizes the political dimension of conflicts, 
which implies that conflicts between opinions cannot be reduced 
to rational deliberation but are unavoidably entangled with 
participants’ identities and emotions (Ruitenberg, 2009; Zembylas, 
2014, 2015). Tryggvason focused on exploring the deliberative 
critique from the vantage point of agonism, rightly pointing out 
that as far as the assumptions made about identities and emotions, 
the deliberative critique of agonism is unfounded and based on a 
misreading of Mouffe’s agonistic theory.
To advance this position, the paper has four main parts. In the 
first part, Tryggvason (2018) discussed how deliberative education 
has generally handled emotions in classroom discussions, high-
lighting that deliberative approaches have underestimated the 
importance of emotions. At the same time, Tryggvason acknowl-
edged that there are scholars in contemporary deliberative theory 
who attempt to address this critique by acknowledging the 
importance of introducing controversial and emotionally charged 
topics into the classroom. In the second part of the paper, Tryggva-
son’s point of departure was Ruitenberg’s (2009) outline of an 
agonistic approach in which the role of political emotions is 
highlighted. Tryggvason identified that a central aspect of this 
approach— which is grounded in Mouffe’s (2005) theory of 
agonistic pluralism— is the destabilization of essentialist identities. 
This idea suggests that the agonistic approach recognizes the 
importance of sustaining the political in emotions, conflicts, and 
identities; it is, therefore, emphasized that there is no escape from 
political emotions in classroom discussions. Political emotions are 
generally understood as those emotions that are directed toward a 
societal object, such as homelessness, compared to moral emotions 
that are directed toward a personal or interpersonal object 
(Ruitenberg, 2009).
The third part of the paper took on the relation between 
identities and political issues. The deliberative perspective is 
concerned that conflicts can easily become clashes between 
individuals because the agonistic approach creates space for the 
different (e.g., ethnic) identities of the persons involved by 
allowing political emotions in a discussion. However, this claim, 
Tryggvason (2018) correctly pointed out, is grounded in the false 
assumption that there is a sharp distinction between identities and 
political issues, whereas it is not necessary that conflicts must stay 
framed in identity- based terms. In this manner, Tryggvason made 
an important point, namely, that the deliberative position rests on 
erroneous assumptions about the agonistic conception of identi-
ties, especially the claim that agonism emphasizes essentialist 
identities. As it was reiterated, understanding of identities and 
political issues within an agonistic frame does not have to be 
framed in essentialist terms (see Zembylas, 2011).
In the last part of the paper, Tryggvason (2018) argued that 
there is room for political emotions in the classroom, but this has 
to take place under certain conditions, namely, an agonistic 
understanding of emotions has to be compatible with the delibera-
tive perspective. However, there are problems with assimilating 
agonism and deliberation because “the idea of agonism as a link to 
deliberation is not compatible with Mouffe’s theory of agonism”  
(p. 7). Therefore, there has to be, Tryggvason argued, a “tamed 
version” (p. 7) of agonism that recognizes deliberation as agonism 
(which is not antagonism). Yet it is clear that “educating students to 
become active democratic citizens could mean different things if 
the teacher takes an agonistic or a deliberative stance” (p. 8). 
Tryggvason emphasized the point that commitment in the 
deliberation process is not just a rational understanding but an 
emotional involvement— which is the agonistic approach’s 
position— yet the issue is not further developed. But why is this 
point so important, especially in citizenship education? Or, to put 
it differently, what are the consequences of cultivating agonistic 
emotions (e.g., commitment, hope, etc.) in political discussions in 
the classroom?
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The Consequences of Cultivating Agonistic Emotions in the 
Classroom
At the heart of agonistic emotions is the idea that affect and 
emotion play an important role in nourishing the ethico- political 
principles that democracies are based on (Mihai, 2014). For 
example, an account of agonistic emotion that can sustain the 
political project of Mouffe’s democratic theory emphasizes  
that democratic emotions are fundamental elements of agonistic 
democracies. For Mouffe, pluralist democracy is conceived in a 
way that does not deny the antagonistic dimension but rather turns 
antagonistic confrontations into agonistic ones (Mouffe, 2005, 
2014). An agonistic relation is one that, while preserving the reality 
of conflict, puts limits on what political agents can do to each other 
(Mihai, 2014); in Mouffe’s (2005) terms, opponents are adversaries 
rather than enemies. In his analysis of Mouffe’s approach, 
Tryggvason pointed out that a form of citizenship education that 
embraces this agonistic approach would also embrace the role of 
political emotions. Tryggvason’s analysis provides fertile ground 
for extending the debate between agonists and deliberators about 
political education. An interesting question emerging from 
Tryggvason’s discussion is: What happens in citizenship education 
when educators and students adopt the emotions that Mouffe 
advocates?
Before responding to this question, it is important first to 
clarify how political emotions are understood in the original piece. 
In general, there are the following indications about emotions in 
Tryggvason’s (2018, p. 6) analysis:
 1. Emotions not only are person- oriented but have a social 
and political dimension (e.g., political hope, political 
resentment).
 2. A strong rationalistic framework of emotions that makes 
a clear distinction between political and moral emotions 
is problematic.
 3. A definition of political emotions that takes as its starting 
point the object toward which the emotion is directed is a 
problematic way of discerning whether it is a political 
emotion or not.
 4. Emotions (e.g., in the classroom) can be made compatible 
(or not) with the ethico- political values of liberty and 
equality.
The above indications allude to what Mihai (2014)— whom 
Tryggvason cited several times throughout his essay— called a 
weak constructivist cognitivist approach, in reference to Mouffe’s 
approach toward emotions. This approach is grounded in the 
following (certainly nonexhaustive list of) assumptions. The 
indications that roughly correspond to each follow:
 1. Sociality, politics, and emotions are entangled; the 
conception of emotion and politics implied here seems to 
be that of a constructivist perspective (e.g., Kemper, 1990, 
2006); namely, emotions become elaborated as social and 
political meanings in conditions of interaction and social 
organization (indications 1, 3).
 2. Emotions are not irrational passions that “contaminate” 
reason; therefore, any distinctions that render emotions 
as less rational are problematic (Armon- Jones, 2003) 
(indication 2).
 3. Emotions are similar to judgments in many ways because 
they express values and they reveal how we see the world 
(de Sousa, 1987; Solomon, 1988) (indication 4).
 4. Emotions can be subjected to critical appraisal and 
evaluation, and therefore, it is possible to generate 
emotions that are compatible to certain values and 
judgments (Armon- Jones, 2003; Solomon, 1988) (indica-
tion 4).
Given the malleability of emotion assumed in the weak construc-
tivist approach, “it is clear that emotions can and are meant to 
fulfill important functions in the reproduction of the collectivity, 
both in terms of limiting undesirable behavior and encouraging 
the wider endorsement of the values defining the group’s identity” 
(Mihai, 2014, pp. 39– 40); thus, it is suggested that emotions can be 
directed to “fit” with the ethico- political principles of a democratic 
society.
In light of these assumptions, especially in relation to the 
earlier question raised about the consequences of cultivating 
agonistic emotions in the classroom, there is an important  
insight emerging from Tryggvason’s (2018) analysis that could 
further extend the discussion concerning the relevance of political 
emotions in the classroom. This insight is that, at the end of the day, 
all emotions are somehow politically relevant (Clarke, Hoggett, & 
Thompson, 2006; Demertzis, 2013); this idea implies that political 
emotions are unavoidably elements of citizenship education. This 
also means that beyond the deliberative or agonistic ideals in the 
classroom, political emotions are present in the classroom and thus 
have to be engaged pedagogically. Therefore, a critical conceptuali-
zation of the entanglement between political emotions and certain 
rules of pedagogical engagement in the classroom is necessary, if 
educators wish to confront the consequences of choosing to 
cultivate some political emotions (rather than others) without 
resorting to ideology or propaganda (see Zembylas, 2014, 2015).
The Contribution of Affective Citizenship in the Debate 
Between Agonists and Deliberators
The second perspective that I want to highlight in my response 
focuses on using affective citizenship education to propose a 
practical application that fuses agonistic and deliberative views. To 
do this, I discuss first how affective citizenship literature informs 
citizenship education and illuminates the debate between agonistic 
and deliberative views; then, I conclude by arguing that affective 
citizenship is an example of a fusion between agonism and 
deliberation.
In her seminal article on affective citizenship, Fortier (2010) 
used the term governing through affect to indicate the management 
of affect for the purpose of community cohesion, namely, how the 
state or other sites of disciplinary power (e.g., fellow citizens, social 
and political organizations) prescribe what it means to be a “good 
citizen.” Thus, there are certain affects, groups, and acts that are 
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treated as desirable or undesirable depending on their influence on 
cohesion (Fortier, 2010, p. 23). As Fortier (2010) explained: “The 
‘affective subject’ becomes ‘affective citizen’ when its membership 
to the ‘community’ is contingent on personal feelings and acts that 
extend beyond the individual self [ . . . ] but which are also directed 
towards the community’” (p. 22). In other words, membership to a 
community becomes contingent on whether subjects direct their 
feelings towards proper acts of citizenship. In her more recent 
work, Fortier (2016) used the term acts of citizenship to refer “to 
both institutional and individual practices of making citizens or 
citizenship, including practices that seek to redefine, decenter  
or even refuse citizenship” (p. 1039).
There are two important implications of using affective 
citizenship literature as a point of departure to propose  
that citizenship education ought to cultivate one kind of political 
emotion or another. The first implication is that affective citizen-
ship literature relocates debates of citizenship education so that 
they explicitly recognize the web of practices that make acts of 
citizenship promoted in the classroom “visible, audible, tangible 
and knowable” (Mol, 2002, p. 33). This means, for example, paying 
careful attention to the elicitation, circulation, and distribution  
of certain emotions for and within a community in relation to the 
codes of conduct of the “good” or “bad” affective citizens (Fortier, 
2016). The affective citizenship literature teaches those of us in 
citizenship education that the cultivation of political emotions is 
inextricably linked to the forms of disciplinary and biopolitical 
power constituted by certain educational policies and pedagogical 
practices, namely, how students and teachers variously experience, 
enact, interpret and feel these policies and practices. Fortier wrote:
Exploring affective citizenship requires focusing on its complex logic: 
how the feelings that attach to citizenship are unevenly distributed 
across gendered, racialized, sexualized, classed bodies— some citizens 
feel safer than others; some citizens are deemed safer than 
others— and, in turn, how subjects’ feelings about citizenship are not 
equally valued— not all desires for citizenship are deemed equally 
desirable. (2016, pp. 1041– 1042)
This idea challenges educators in citizenship education to engage 
students in questioning how various actors are engaged together 
(e.g., deliberation) and in opposition to each other (e.g., agonism) 
with political issues that are inevitably affective (Di Gregorio & 
Merolli, 2016)— a learning process that might yield critical insights 
into how certain attachments to citizenship that are cultivated can 
facilitate but also erode emancipatory projects in citizenship 
education. This point brings me to the second implication I want to 
discuss here, namely, how affective citizenship may constitute an 
example of a fusion between agonism and deliberation.
Affective citizenship literature illuminates the debate between 
agonists and deliberators by highlighting that political discussions 
in the classroom are not only bound up within state or other 
disciplinary power relations but also (already) take place in the 
context of certain affective attachments (Fortier, 2016). For 
example, some feelings attach themselves to citizenship (e.g., 
belonging, pride, etc.); therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
certain acts and practices in or beyond the classroom (e.g., 
inclusive or exclusive practices) can bring up such feelings 
(Ahmed, 2014). In the context of citizenship education, this idea 
implies that one needs to examine under which conditions 
cultivating acts of solidarity, empathy, belonging, and struggles for 
democratic freedom are relevant to citizenship: how ethically and 
politically appropriate is it to “manage” such affective acts in the 
classroom? Thus, encouraging students to deliberate or even 
engage in acts of citizenship that are more inclusive (e.g., welcom-
ing refugees and migrants) and challenge normative rules of 
citizenship has important affective and political consequences that 
need to be acknowledged and critically explored in the classroom.
Acknowledging these issues in the context of efforts to 
assimilate agonism with deliberation in citizenship education can 
provide a basis for renewing debates on the role of political 
emotions in deliberative and/or agonistic education. Affective 
citizenship, then, constitutes an example that fuses deliberation 
and agonism, because it pays attention to both political emo-
tions and the procedural framework through which diverse 
opinions are enabled within a deliberative space (e.g., in the 
classroom). Learning how to feel about citizenship, how to act and 
feel as citizens, including how to protest as citizens or against terms 
of citizenship that are exclusive to some people is “invariably 
bound up with what we know about citizenship and its (failed) 
promises, much of which is assumed and taken for granted” 
(Fortier, 2016, p. 1041). Hence, the pedagogical or philosophical 
approach used through which we learn about/from citizenship is 
inextricably linked to affective citizenship and its challenges.
The above discussion implies that educators in citizenship 
education need to cultivate pedagogical skills with which they 
can navigate the ethical, political, and emotional challenges of 
affective citizenship (Zembylas, 2014). Practically, this means 
that teachers might require, for example: to develop the capacity 
to expose and critique the entanglements of affective citizenship 
and political emotions in the classroom; to become capable to 
critically assess the politicization of affective citizenship and its 
various manifestations; and to be able to anticipate what might 
happen when certain political emotions are adopted and, most 
importantly, how affective attachments to certain bodies (e.g., 
fear, resentment) might change. Engaging with the pedagogical 
consequences of cultivating agonistic emotions or the delibera-
tive principles for political discussions in the classroom goes 
beyond a simple opposition between agonism and deliberation. It 
requires critical insights and pedagogical skills into how affective 
attachments to various citizenship ideals can be navigated 
towards facilitating or crippling democratic and emancipatory 
ethos.
Concluding Remarks
Tryggvason (2018) reiterated that the form citizenship education 
should take to promote active democratic citizenship within the 
frames of deliberation and agonism is essentially an open 
question that needs to be further explored. In my response to 
Tryggvason’s essay, I have attempted to delineate merely two 
perspectives of this exploration that have to do with the relevance 
of political emotions and the use of affective citizenship as an 
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example of fusing deliberation and agonism. Enriching further 
the theoretical and empirical understandings of political emo-
tions and affective citizenship in relation to agonism and delib-
eration requires asking critical questions about how the 
entanglement of power, politics and affect in citizenship educa-
tion projects (deliberative and/or agonistic) can create openings 
for transformation or bring closures to emancipatory acts of 
citizenship. What a fusion of agonistic and deliberative perspec-
tives offers through affective citizenship education is an open- 
ended democratic project with both challenges and possibilities. 
Perhaps the real strength of this fused account lies not in the form 
of any solution but rather in that it provides a different way of 
viewing and feeling exclusion, conflict and difference in learning 
from/about citizenship.
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